Protein design campaign
SkillMediaGated protein design campaign: each expert judgement is a checkpoint a human signs off before compute is spent. Branches: de novo binder design (epitope choice, generation, co-folding ensemble ranking, ranked order sheet); structure and complex prediction with calibrated confidence; protein engineer
Use Protein design campaign in Claude, ChatGPT or Ahel Desktop
Free. Sign in, add Protein design campaign and connect your AI. About a minute.
Also: Claude Code · Cursor · Codex
Then ask your AI: use the Protein design campaign skill
Details
Instructions available. Your AI can read the instructions. Execution depends on the setup they require.
Account requirements not reviewed. Check the skill instructions before use; Ahel provides instructions and does not run this skill.
No other account needed.
Add Ahel to your AI once: Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Claude Code or Codex. Then ask it to use this.
What this skill tells your AI
The instructions your AI receives, as published by spyfighting/my-academic-skills in binder-design-campaign/SKILL.md and read by Ahel’s review.
Three branches, one core. First turn the user's goal into a reviewable campaign plan; after the user chooses how far to execute, the evidence rules and deliverable discipline below hold for all three branches.
| Branch | Read | For |
|---|---|---|
| binder design | workflows/binder-design.md | miniprotein binders against a protein target |
| structure prediction | workflows/structure-prediction.md | folds or complexes with calibrated confidence |
| protein engineering | workflows/protein-design-general.md | stability, enzyme, interface, scaffold redesign |
Provenance and rationale: docs/ and NOTICE.md, relative to this skill.
Non-negotiables
These hold at every depth, including inside sub-agents, and bind hardest on the steps nobody is watching.
- State only what you established. Every claim in a report, update or manifest traces to an executed computation or a saved artifact you can point at. Verified means you ran the check and hold its output.
- Every external identifier is fetched. DOIs, PMIDs, PDB IDs, UniProt accessions, residue ranges and URLs in any deliverable are the literal output of a lookup executed in this session.
- Anomalies are bugs until investigated. A score of exactly zero, a gate that passes everything, a gate that fails everything, a constant metric, a perfect metric, an impossible runtime, zero variance across seeds: halt that stage, diagnose, then proceed.
- Cheapest falsifying check first. Run the seconds-scale check that could kill a plan before committing hours of GPU to it.
- Lead with the unfavourable reading. Headline the worst defensible interpretation of your own data. Disclose deviations from the stated method, and name analyses tuned after seeing results along with how many configurations you tried. Report inconclusive results as inconclusive.
- The instrument is a filter, never an oracle. In silico confidence ranks
designs within a target. It does not tell you whether a target will work,
and it relates only weakly to affinity — measured, not assumed
(
references/failure-modes.md§1). Every summary you write says so. - Verify inherited inputs. Check target structures, construct definitions and hotspot numbering against their primary source before building on them.
- Scope. This protocol is in silico and it ends at the design sheet.
Validation is in vitro, by the user or a CRO; analysing returned assay data
is a different task and does not run under these gates. Results from an
earlier round enter here as operator input at G0, never as something this
protocol goes and fetches. Work on select agents or toxins, and enhancement
of pathogen function, is out of scope: stop and say so. See
docs/responsible-use.md.
Plan, authorization and checkpoints
Read references/campaign-planning.md before G0. Research what can be found
independently, then ask the user for the remaining outcome, constraint and
resource boundaries in one concise round. Create state/campaign_plan.md from
templates/campaign_plan.md. It states the stage sequence, evidence needed at
each checkpoint, expected outputs, estimated compute, unresolved assumptions,
and actions needing separate permission. G0 is the one required review: do
not start execution until the user approves the plan and selects an
authorized_through_stage from 0 to 10. A value of 0 means plan only; 10
authorizes the in-silico campaign through delivery. Record that decision in
state/decisions.jsonl and state/authorization.json.
G1–G6 are scientific and artifact checkpoints. At each, read the corresponding
section of checklists/gate-checklists.md, save its evidence and decision, and
continue when the approved stage limit covers the next stage. The agent makes
in-scope scientific choices from sourced evidence; the user may require a
review stop at any checkpoint or override a choice. A checkpoint never serves
as a request for an unqualified user to certify a protein-engineering claim.
Stop and return a reviewable result when the approved stage limit is reached,
when a material premise changes, or when an action needs resources or external
permission outside the approved plan. Do not silently widen the scope.
| Checkpoint | Records | Stage reached |
|---|---|---|
| G0 | user-approved plan, execution limit, resources and permissions | 0 |
| G1 | assay construct, reference structure, cofactors | 2 |
| G2 | epitope and hotspot residues | 3 |
| G3 | scoring evidence level and frozen instrument | 4 |
| G4 | compute allocation per target | 5 |
| G5 | the ranked set proposed for testing | 9 |
| G6 | acceptance checks against delivered artifacts | 10 |
Two carry most of the risk:
- G2 decides most of the outcome. Epitope choice dominates model choice.
- G3 is mechanical. Production jobs require a validated gate file. A
fold-only gate is visibly weaker than positive-control separation and requires
explicit inclusion in the approved plan;
scripts/preflight.pyrefuses it otherwise. A stated belief that the instrument works is not evidence.
Checkpoints also re-open mid-run. Changing the assay construct, a catalytic or otherwise load-bearing residue, the off-target definition, or the endpoint the campaign is aimed at changes the scientific question — so return to the checkpoint that owns it and obtain approval for the revised plan when the change affects the user's goal, resource ceiling, external actions or authorized stage limit.
Completion bar for an authorized segment: every stage through its approved
limit has saved artifacts and checks; G6 completion requires the full campaign
artifacts. The user's G0 authorization and any later amendments are recorded in
state/decisions.jsonl. Agent scientific decisions are recorded separately as
agent decisions with their evidence.
Between gates
You work on your own here, subject to five standing obligations.
- Ledger before narrative. Every job appends one row to the JSONL ledger
(
scripts/ledger.py). Every count you state anywhere is an aggregation over that ledger computed at report time. - Nothing is discarded. If it was computed, it is saved: the exact config that produced it (model, version, weights checksum, environment id, command line, contig or epitope spec, seeds, input paths), every structure file, every metric at the level it was computed, the run manifest, stdout and stderr.
- Canary before fan-out. Any fan-out past roughly 10 jobs follows one canary from the same spec, confirmed past startup with sane output.
- Progress, not liveness. A job alive and producing nothing is a failure in progress. Gate completion on output counts and explicit markers.
- Surface a blocker when it blocks, not at the next gate.
Campaign spine
G0 approved plan -> setup + tool bring-up -> G1 dossier -> G2 epitope
-> G3 instrument validation -> G4 scale -> generate & screen
-> optimisation -> final-tier scoring -> G5 selection -> G6 delivery
Bring-up runs before G1 because it is slow and its outcome constrains what you
can honestly promise at G2 and G4. A tool joins the roster only after
running end to end on a real campaign target, in the environment and flags
production will use, with its output consumed by the next stage — the handoff,
not the tool alone (references/tool-catalog.md §1).
Sub-agents
Where the runtime offers parallel sub-tasks, split by (target x stage) or (target x model); each brief inherits the non-negotiables and owns only its scope. Where it does not, run the same decomposition serially and say so — the protocol depends on the decomposition, not on the parallelism.
Adversarial review is part of the protocol. Before G6, one reviewer re-derives a sample of scores from raw inputs, and one forms its verdict from raw data without reading your conclusions. Every finding ships with the query or script that produced its numbers.
Reference index
| File | Read it |
|---|---|
references/campaign-planning.md | before G0, and when the authorized stage or scope changes |
checklists/gate-checklists.md | at every gate — G0 also sets the scale preset |
templates/campaign_plan.md | write the staged plan for user review at G0 |
references/target-dossier-guide.md | building the dossier, before G1 |
references/failure-modes.md | before G2, before G5, and whenever a result looks too good |
references/validation-gates.md | at G3, or when a control fails |
references/scoring-instrument.md | defining, running or changing the score |
templates/scoring_policy.yaml | the ranking formula itself — frozen at G3, and the only place it is written |
references/thresholds.md | choosing absolute cutoffs, or diagnosing a low pass rate |
references/tool-catalog.md | choosing, sizing, installing or dropping a tool |
references/compute-backends.md | wiring the scheduler, at G0 |
references/deliverables-spec.md | building any deliverable |
templates/ | starting a dossier, config, sheet schema or report |
scripts/ | before G5, and against the as-shipped artifacts before G6 |
Tool names, flags, weight URLs and licence facts here were correct at their recorded date and are re-verified against the upstream README, model card or paper before use; upstream wins, and the discrepancy goes in the campaign log.
Signals
- GitHub stars
- 21
- Last commit
- Sep 2026
Ahel review
K1binfo
installs-packages (in sources/anthropic/multi_target_binder_design_prompt.md)
Automated review, not a security audit. Ruleset v1+k2.
Advanced
- Item type
- skill
- Key
binder-design-campaign- Source
- github.com/spyfighting/my-academic-skills
github.com/spyfighting/my-academic-skills