SKILL: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
SkillFiles & storageGives your agent expert offensive security playbooks for attacks like SQL injection, exploit development, and EDR evasion.
Available today. Use it from your connected AI after setup.
No other account needed.
Connect ahel once, and every AI you use reads what you have installed.
Then ask your AI: use the SKILL: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) skill
About this capability
claude-red is a curated library of offensive security skills designed for the Claude skills system. Each skill is a structured SKILL.md file that primes Claude with expert-level methodology for a specific attack surface — from SQLi to shellcode, EDR evasion to exploit development.
What this skill tells your AI
The instructions your AI receives, as published by snailsploit/claude-red in Skills/web/offensive-parameter-pollution/SKILL.md and read by ahel’s review.
Metadata
- Skill Name: parameter-pollution
- Folder: offensive-parameter-pollution
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/parameter-pollution.md
Description
HTTP parameter pollution (HPP) checklist: duplicate parameter injection, backend vs frontend parsing differences, WAF bypass via HPP, server-side vs client-side HPP, and practical exploitation patterns. Use when testing web applications for parameter handling flaws.
Trigger Phrases
Use this skill when the conversation involves any of:
parameter pollution, HTTP parameter pollution, HPP, duplicate parameter, WAF bypass, parsing differences, server-side HPP, client-side HPP, parameter injection
Instructions for Claude
When this skill is active:
- Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist
- Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise
- For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context
- Track which checklist items have been completed
- Suggest next steps based on findings
Full Methodology
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
Mechanisms
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) is a web attack technique that exploits how web applications and servers handle multiple occurrences of the same parameter name. When a web application receives duplicate parameters, different technologies process them differently:
flowchart TD
subgraph "HTTP Parameter Pollution"
A[Multiple occurrences of same parameter] --> B{Server Technology}
B -->|ASP.NET/IIS| C[Uses first occurrence]
B -->|PHP/Apache| D[Uses last occurrence]
B -->|JSP/Tomcat| E[Uses first occurrence]
B -->|Perl CGI| F[Concatenates with comma]
B -->|Python/Flask| G[Builds array of values]
B -->|Node.js/Express| H[Uses first occurrence]
end
Parameter Handling Behaviors
- ASP.NET/IIS: Uses the first occurrence of the parameter
- PHP/Apache: Uses the last occurrence of the parameter
- JSP/Tomcat: Uses the first occurrence of the parameter
- Perl CGI/Apache: Concatenates all occurrences with a comma delimiter
- Python/Flask: Builds an array of values
- Node.js/Express: Uses the first occurrence by default
Notes and modern caveats
- Node.js
expressuses eitherquerystring(first-wins) orqs(arrays/last-wins).app.set('query parser', 'extended')changes behavior. Many middlewares assumeparam[]=a¶m[]=bfor arrays; duplicates without[]can produce surprising results. - Spring MVC/Spring Boot binders often collect duplicates into lists; API gateways (Kong, APIGEE, NGINX, Cloudflare) may collapse/normalize differently than backends.
- JSON duplicate keys: most parsers accept last-wins; some gateways reject duplicates while backends accept, creating precedence gaps.
- Cookies: duplicate cookie names and comma/semicolon handling vary by proxies/agents.
HPP attacks leverage these inconsistencies in parameter handling across application layers, servers, proxies, and frameworks. Two main types of HPP exist:
- Server-side HPP: Exploiting the server's handling of multiple parameters
- Client-side HPP: Manipulating parameters that are later processed by client-side code
Hunt
Identifying HPP Vulnerabilities
sequenceDiagram
participant Attacker
participant WebApp
participant Backend
Attacker->>WebApp: Request with duplicate parameter<br/>param=safe¶m=malicious
Note over WebApp: Layer 1 processes first value
WebApp->>Backend: Forward request to backend
Note over Backend: Layer 2 processes last value
Backend->>WebApp: Process with malicious value
WebApp->>Attacker: Response
Testing Parameter Handling
-
Identify forms and request parameters
-
Test duplicate parameters with different values:
// Original request https://example.com/search?param=value1 // Test request https://example.com/search?param=value1¶m=value2 -
Observe application behavior
-
Identify which value is used (first, last, concatenated)
Vulnerable Scenarios
- Parameter Overriding: Search for places where parameters might be overridden
- Request Proxies: Applications forwarding requests to other services
- Query String Processing: Applications that process query strings manually
- Multiple-Layer Processing: Applications where parameters pass through multiple layers
- OAuth/SAML Flows: Authentication flows where parameters may be manipulated
Testing Techniques
URL Parameter Pollution
# Original URL
https://target.com/page?parameter=original_value
# Polluted URL
https://target.com/page?parameter=original_value¶meter=malicious_value
Form Parameter Pollution
-
Intercept a legitimate form submission
-
Add duplicate parameters with different values:
// Original POST body parameter=original_value // Modified POST body parameter=original_value¶meter=malicious_value
Hybrid Parameter Pollution
Combining parameters in both URL and POST body:
// URL
https://target.com/page?parameter=url_value
// POST body
parameter=body_value
JSON Parameter Pollution
Testing duplicate keys in JSON objects:
{
"parameter": "value1",
"parameter": "value2"
}
Also test:
Cookie: role=user; role=admin
X-Role: user
X-Role: admin
Observe which value the application trusts.
GraphQL Parameter Pollution
GraphQL queries can be polluted through aliasing, batch mutations, and duplicate variables:
# Alias pollution - bypass rate limits
query {
a: user(id: 1) {
name
email
}
b: user(id: 2) {
name
email
}
c: user(id: 3) {
name
email
}
# ... repeat to z or beyond
}
# Variable pollution
query ($id: Int!, $id: Int!) {
user(id: $id) {
name
}
}
# Batch mutation pollution
mutation {
a: redeemCoupon(code: "SAVE50") {
success
}
b: redeemCoupon(code: "SAVE50") {
success
}
c: redeemCoupon(code: "SAVE50") {
success
}
}
WebSocket Parameter Pollution
WebSocket connections can carry polluted parameters in the upgrade request or message payloads:
GET /chat HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
# URL with polluted params
ws://vulnerable.com/chat?token=valid&token=malicious&room=1&room=admin
// WebSocket message payload pollution
{
"action": "sendMessage",
"room": "public",
"room": "admin",
"message": "test"
}
Parameter Array Notation Pollution
Different frameworks handle array notation differently, creating pollution opportunities:
# PHP - expects brackets
param[]=value1¶m[]=value2
# Express (qs parser) - bracket optional
param=value1¶m=value2
# Rails - numeric indices
param[0]=value1¶m[1]=value2
# Mixed notation confusion
param=single¶m[]=array1¶m[0]=indexed
Testing strategy:
- Test with
param=a¶m=b(no brackets) - Test with
param[]=a¶m[]=b(array notation) - Test with
param[0]=a¶m[1]=b(indexed) - Mix notations to confuse parsers
Parameter Cloaking
Using encoding and case variations to bypass filters:
# URL encoding variations
param=value1&par%61m=value2
param=value1&PARAM=value2
# Double/triple encoding
param=value1&par%2561m=value2
# Unicode normalization
param=value1&pαram=value2 # Greek alpha instead of 'a'
# Null byte injection (legacy)
param=value1¶m%00=value2
Vulnerabilities
Common HPP Vulnerabilities
graph LR
subgraph "HPP Attack Vectors"
A[HTTP Parameter Pollution] --> B[Access Control Bypass]
A --> C[Request Forgery Enhancement]
A --> D[Data Manipulation]
A --> E[API Vulnerabilities]
B --> B1[Parameter Override]
B --> B2[Permission Escalation]
C --> C1[CSRF Token Bypass]
C --> C2[SSRF Augmentation]
D --> D1[SQL Query Manipulation]
D --> D2[Filter Evasion]
E --> E1[Parameter Precedence]
E --> E2[OAuth Manipulation]
end
Access Control Bypass
- Parameter Override: Overriding security-related parameters
https://example.com/admin?access=false&access=true - Permission Escalation: Adding administrative parameters
https://example.com/profile?user=victim&user=admin
Request Forgery Enhancement
- CSRF Token Bypass: Duplicating anti-CSRF tokens
https://example.com/transfer?token=valid_token&token=random_value&amount=1000 - SSRF Augmentation: Overriding restricted URLs
https://example.com/fetch?url=safe.com&url=internal.server
Data Manipulation
- SQL Query Manipulation: Influencing SQL queries
https://example.com/products?category=1&category=1 OR 1=1 - Filter Evasion: Bypassing input filters
https://example.com/search?q=safe_value&q=<script>alert(1)</script>
API Vulnerabilities
- Parameter Precedence Confusion: Different parameter precedence between API gateway and backend
- GraphQL Parameter Pollution: Duplicate variables in GraphQL queries
- OAuth Parameter Manipulation: Manipulating OAuth redirect flows
- Header/Cookie Pollution: Conflicting header values across CDN → WAF → app layers
Impact Scenarios
Authentication Bypass
# Application authenticates using the first parameter but authorizes using the last
https://example.com/login?role=user&role=admin
WAF Bypass
# WAF checks the first parameter, backend processes the last
https://example.com/search?q=safe&q=<script>alert(1)</script>
XML External Entity (XXE) via HPP
# Bypassing XML filtering by parameter pollution
https://example.com/upload?xml=safe&xml=<!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>
API Gateway vs Backend Precedence
# Gateway picks first id, backend picks last id -> IDOR/AC bypass
/api/user?id=123&id=999
Methodologies
Tools
- Burp Suite Pro: Parameter pollution testing via Repeater and Intruder
- OWASP ZAP: HTTP fuzzer for parameter testing
- Param Miner: Extension for discovering hidden parameters
- HPP Finder: Specialized tool for HPP vulnerability detection
- Burp Repeater (Parallel): Validate precedence across layers quickly
- Schemathesis: Fuzz OpenAPI-defined endpoints for duplicate-field handling
Testing Methodology
flowchart TD
A[HPP Testing Methodology] --> B[Initial Discovery]
A --> C[Exploit Development]
A --> D[Impact Assessment]
B --> B1[Map application parameters]
B --> B2[Test duplicate parameters]
B --> B3[Document behavior]
C --> C1[Access control testing]
C --> C2[Security control bypass]
C --> C3[API security testing]
D --> D1[Authentication bypass]
D --> D2[Authorization bypass]
D --> D3[Data manipulation]
Initial Discovery
- Map all application parameters (URL, form, cookie, header)
- Test each parameter with duplicates to observe behavior
- Document how different application components handle parameter duplication
Exploiting HPP for Web Application Testing
-
Access Control Testing:
# Test privileged parameter override https://example.com/admin?admin=false&admin=true # Test user context override https://example.com/profile?id=attacker&id=victim -
Security Control Bypass:
# Test CSRF token pollution token=legitimate&token=fake # Test parameter validation bypass param=valid_value¶m=malicious_value -
API Security Testing:
# Test API parameter handling /api/v1/user?id=123&id=456 # Test with different content types Content-Type: application/json {"id": "123", "id": "456"} -
HTTP Request Smuggling via HPP:
# Testing inconsistent interpretation Transfer-Encoding: chunked Transfer-Encoding: identity -
Header/Cookie Pollution:
Cookie: session=abc; session=attacker
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Forwarded-Proto: https
Real-World Test Cases
E-commerce Application Testing
# Price manipulation
https://shop.com/checkout?price=100&price=1
# Quantity override
https://shop.com/cart?quantity=1&quantity=100
Banking Application Testing
# Amount parameter pollution
https://bank.com/transfer?amount=100&amount=10000
# Recipient override
https://bank.com/transfer?to=legitimate&to=attacker
CMS Admin Testing
# Permission bypass
https://cms.com/edit?permission=read&permission=write
# User impersonation
https://cms.com/admin?user=admin&user=victim
Social Sharing Button Parameter Pollution
A specific case of parameter pollution that affects social sharing functionality:
-
Testing Methodology:
# Original share URL https://target.com/article # Polluted share URL https://target.com/article?u=https://attacker.com&text=malicious_text -
Common Parameters:
uorurl: The URL to be sharedtext: Custom text for the sharetitle: Title of the shared contentdescription: Description for the shared content
-
Impact:
- Redirect users to malicious sites
- Modify shared content
- Social engineering attacks
- Brand reputation damage
-
Testing Steps:
- Identify social sharing functionality
- Analyze original share parameters
- Append malicious parameters
- Test each social platform separately
- Verify if malicious content appears in share preview
Real-World Cases and CVEs
Notable Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities
-
CVE-2021-41773 - Apache HTTP Server Path Traversal:
- Parameter pollution in URL path normalization
- Multiple encoded path segments bypassed access controls
- Impact: Remote code execution via CGI scripts
-
CVE-2018-8033 - Apache OFBiz:
- Parameter pollution in authentication bypass
- Duplicate parameters in login form bypassed security checks
- Impact: Administrative access without credentials
-
HPP in OAuth Implementations (Multiple Vendors):
- Duplicate
redirect_uriparameters in OAuth flows - Gateway checked first parameter, backend used last
- Impact: Account takeover via malicious redirect
- Duplicate
-
API Gateway vs Backend Precedence (Bug Bounty):
- AWS API Gateway processed first
idparameter - Backend Lambda function processed last
idparameter - Impact: IDOR allowing access to other users' data
- AWS API Gateway processed first
-
GraphQL Rate Limit Bypass (Multiple Platforms):
- Aliased queries bypassed per-query rate limits
- 100+ identical operations in single request
- Impact: Account enumeration, resource exhaustion
-
WAF Bypass via HPP (Generic):
- WAF inspected first parameter for XSS/SQLi
- Backend processed last parameter
- Impact: Complete WAF bypass for injection attacks
Impact Ratings
- Critical: HPP enables authentication/authorization bypass or RCE
- High: HPP allows WAF bypass, payment manipulation, or privilege escalation
- Medium: HPP bypasses rate limiting or validation controls
- Low: HPP causes logic errors with minimal security impact
Common Bug Bounty Targets
- E-commerce checkout flows (price/quantity parameters)
- OAuth/SAML redirect parameters
- API endpoints with pagination/filtering
- File upload with filename/path parameters
- Social sharing functionality
- Payment processing integrations
- Multi-step wizards/forms
Remediation Recommendations
- Consistent Parameter Handling: Implement consistent handling across all application layers
- Parameter Validation: Validate parameters before processing
- Framework Awareness: Understand how your framework handles duplicate parameters
- Web Application Firewall: Configure WAF to detect parameter pollution attempts
- API Gateway Rules: Implement rules to reject duplicate parameters
- Canonicalization: Convert parameters to a standard form before processing
- Schema Enforcement: Use JSON Schema/OpenAPI validation to reject duplicates and unexpected fields
- Drop Duplicates at the Edge: Normalize parameters at CDN/API gateway and log events
- Explicit Parser Settings: e.g., in Express set a custom query parser and explicitly forbid duplicates without
[]suffix for arrays - GraphQL Query Complexity Limits: Enforce maximum query depth and alias counts
- WebSocket Frame Validation: Parse and validate WS message structures consistently with HTTP parameter handling
Signals
- GitHub stars
- 3k
- Forks
- 511
- Last commit
- Aug 2026
Advanced
- Catalog kind
- skill
- Gateway key
offensive-parameter-pollution- Source
- github.com/snailsploit/claude-red