raytsystem Security Review

Inputs and outputs

• Accept one bounded change/run plus threat model and declared permissions.
• Return confirmed or unproven Critical/High findings with repro, violated invariant, and minimal regression test/fix.

Write scope

• Keep review read-only; run only non-mutating diagnostics or isolated synthetic tests.
• Never read secrets without scoped necessity, disclose values, promote, publish, or modify external systems.

Preflight

1. Run uv run raytsystem agent preflight --skill raytsystem-security-review --write --json locally.
2. Run agent subagent-check before delegation; hosted review receives only safe excerpts.
3. Snapshot declared canonical/external state and identify every write/egress boundary.

Workflow

1. Trace untrusted input through Fetcher/Extractor/proposal/validation/promotion/query/save paths.
2. Test raw/hash/citation closure, generation races, lease fencing, WAL/pointer crash windows, and idempotency.
3. Test SQL/FTS injection, resource limits, archive/parser containment, symlink/hardlink/no-follow paths, and secret redaction.
4. Verify zero unapproved process/network/outbox/Git/external action.

Validation

• Require a regression test for every confirmed Critical/High issue.
• Re-run scoped and full gates after fixes; never accept skipped required tests.
• Exercise evals m3-security-review-golden and m3-security-review-adversarial.

Recovery

• Preserve failed staging and machine-readable reports; retry only classified transient failures.
• On quota/tool loss, list exact reviewed surfaces and remaining adversarial cases.

Stop and approval conditions

• Stop on secret/PII exposure, unsafe external destination, real promotion, destructive action, or missing authority.
• Do not downgrade a confirmed issue because exploitation is inconvenient; fail closed and request the narrow required approval.